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Executive Registry

86-
0488

5 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of of Soviet Analysis, DI
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Worldwide Briefing

At the HPSCI worldwide briefing you seemed to say that the comparison in my testimony of the number of weapons in the two arsenals was based on dollars rather than units. Did I get that right? Don't we have to have the unit numbers in order to arrive at the dollars or rubles? I think my statement indicates units instead of dollars. I also wonder whether letting that comparison get circulated too widely abroad tells too much about our own capabilities. I know that Cap has used it but I am not sure he has used it publicly. I was assured the briefing which included this comparison had been sanitized so that it need not be classified. Will you check this out and give me your advice as soon as you can.



William J. Casey

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		6 February 1986	
TO: Executive Registry			
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FROM: DD/SOVA			
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Executive Registry

86-

0488/1

6 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: 

Acting Director of Soviet Analysis

SUBJECT: Your Question on the Worldwide Briefing

1. You are correct in your assumption that the comparison of US and Soviet procurement of major weapon systems is based on the number of units procured. The figures on the attached page from your briefing (Tab A) represent a comparison of what the Soviets actually produced in the 1974-1984 period with US production over the same period. While it is true that our dollar and ruble costs estimates of Soviet defense activities are driven by these data, the comparisons in this instance are in terms of physical units. (S)

2. Regarding your question on classification, Soviet production figures that are highly aggregated and cover several years (eg. tank and ICBM production over five years) can be declassified without endangering sources and methods. While we believe that single year estimates of Soviet production, series data which reveal annual production estimates, and production data for individual weapons programs (such as the SS-X-24 ICBM) should remain classified, DoD has traditionally taken a much looser approach to the release of such data. (See Tab B which is a page from the FY87 USRE Posture Statement.) (S)

3. Historical US production numbers are generally unclassified even at the individual weapon level. Therefore, US-Soviet comparisons of the kind you have in your briefing that show only general relationships can be released at the unclassified level. (U)

Attachments:

As stated

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SUBJECT: Your Question on the Worldwide Briefing

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(6 February 1986)

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The important thing is not how much the Soviets spend on arms, but the quantity and quality of arms they get for their money. When you compare US and Soviet procurement of major weapons systems, from 1974-1984, the Soviet advantage in:

ICBMs and SLBMs is roughly about	3 times
IRBMs and MRBMs is roughly about	6 times
Surface-to-Air missiles is roughly about	9 times
Long and Intermediate Range Bombers is more than	50 times
Fighters is roughly about	twice
Helicopters is more than	twice
Submarines is more than	twice
Tanks is more than	3 times
Artillery pieces is more than	10 times

The steady growth of Soviet weapons procurement from the high level of the last decade will give the Soviets a massive cumulative inventory of weapons, and they will continue to substantially modernize their forces in the next five years and buy larger numbers of weapons.

This huge military force and its continued growth may never be used against the United States or NATO--although the Soviets clearly are prepared to use it if their vital interests are threatened. The mere existence of this force not only validates the Soviet Union as a superpower, but has an intimidating effect on countries around the world helping the Soviets expand their presence, influence, and power. It represents the backdrop for an aggressive challenge being played out worldwide, but most particularly on the ground in the Third World and in the vicinity of critical sea lanes.

**Table IV-2. Production Summary of Selected Land Force Systems
for NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces, 1976-1985**

Category	1976-1985 Annual Average				1985				10-Year Trend	
	U.S.	USSR	NATO	Warsaw Pact	U.S.	USSR	NATO	Warsaw Pact	U.S.	USSR
Tanks	735	2360	1240	2750	1375	2900	1925	3400	↑	↑
Other Armored Vehicles (Infantry Combat Vehicles)	860 (210)	4840 (3440)	2110 (380)	5600 (3760)	1700 (655)	4800 (3500)	3800 (1055)	5100 (3600)	↑ ↑	— —
Artillery, Mortars & Rocket Launchers (100mm and over)	214	2860	484	3185	330	4100	630	4650	↑	↑
Anti-Aircraft Artillery	6	85	395	200	25	100	75	175	— ^a	—

^a Sgt York production cancelled beyond 1985.

considered at this time. Additional live fire tests are scheduled for early 1986 to evaluate design changes and product improvements necessary to increase survivability.

The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV-25) is the Marine Corps lightweight direct fire support weapon system. Initial Operation Capability of the LAV-25 was achieved in July 1984. The last of the 758 vehicles scheduled for procurement will roll off the production line in June 1987.

The vehicles which will replace all of the quarter ton through five-quarter ton trucks are the High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV). The multi-year production contract for the HMMWV

was awarded in March 1983 with the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) achieved in September 1985. The multi-year production contract for the CUCV was awarded in July 1982 with full IOC capability achieved in July 1984.

Infantry anti-tank forces represent a vital component of the close combat mission area. Recent advances in Soviet tank armor have seriously degraded the capabilities of our family of infantry anti-tank weapons including LAW, Dragon and TOW. As a result, the department continues, on a high priority basis, to pursue programs to improve or to replace these systems with others that have increased lethality, accuracy, and effectiveness.

In the near term, TOW 2 production and TOW 2 lethality